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SOCIAL RISK AND THE MANAGEMENT OF MNCS – FROM RISK SOCIETY TO 





Multinational companies (MNCs) are increasing being exposed to risk that originate from local 
communities in the business environment where they operate. The response has been to implement 
systems for stakeholder engagement by including social issues into their risk management systems. 
However, these seem to be ineffective in mitigating local community grievances. In this paper I argue 
that social risk is to be defined in terms of how local stakeholders construct reality through a 
sensemaking and framing process which constitute at risk by its combined capability to influence 
organisational value creating activities. By utilizing a cross-disciplinary approach founded in a 
sociological conceptualization of risk I show that there is an alternative to identification and mitigation 
of social risk. I propose that MNCs could improve their performance by organizing their efforts using 
“intelligent” systems, which are based on the capability to identify frames and sensemaking processes. 
This paper show how social risk management can be conventionalised using distinct theoretical 
domains taking its outset in a sociological perspective on risk, linking International Business (IB) risk 
management practices, operationalised through Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) systems, with 
communication theory and risk as frames of meaning constructed by community members and 
corporate decision makers. 
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Social risk is a concept that has been used and to some degree misused without being too concerned 
about what the concept actually means other than it has to do with the sometime troublesome 
relationship business have with its stakeholders (Holzmann et al. 2003; Tamara et al. 2006). With the 
rise of globalisation organisations, companies and not least Multinationals companies (MNCs) come 
in contact with risks from local communities in the form of protests that can influence its reputation or 
activism that can have an effect on daily operations. In some cases these can affect the organisations 
ability to operate efficiently and/or ultimately close down operations entirely (Giddens, 1990; Beck, 
1992; 2007; BSR, 2003; Luhmann, 2005). MNCs like Shell, Nike and Apple are on an continues basis 
confronted with these types of risk in the form of unresolved issues despite comprehensive systems to 
mitigate these by including social factors into their risk management approach (DeTienne and Lewis, 
2005; Onouha, 2008; Gua et al, 2012). I argue that social risk is to be defined in terms of how local 
stakeholders construct reality through a sensemaking and framing process which constitute at risk by 
its combined capability to influence organisational value creating activities. And MNCs can by 
applying a cross-disciplinary approach that is founded in a sociological conceptualization of risk and 
utilizing tools from communication studies present an effective alternative approach to identification 
and mitigation of these types of complex risk. I proposed that companies could improve their social 
risk mitigation by organizing their efforts using “intelligent” CSR systems, which are based on the 
capability to identify sensemaking and framing processes in the local communities where the MNC is 
active. This approach does not exclude so-called objective measurements but supplements these tools 
by focusing on community sensemaking processes and creating an appropriate response utilizing 
communicative tools from scenario building and crisis management. This paper offers a conceptual 
understanding of social risk and the management hereof by answering the research question; how 
social risk management can be conventionalised or simplified using distinct theoretical domains taking 
its outset in a sociological perspective on risk. This is done by linking International business (IB) 
community risk management practices operationalized through Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
systems with Communication theory. 
 
Conceptualising risk – From modernity to the post-modern 
There is no uniform definition of risk within sociology but the concept takes its outset in the field of 
management and its roots in industrialisation and modernity. Originating from practice and the halls of 
the executive suite a conceptual form of risk had a hard time finding its ontological and 
epistemological platform. However, most agree that risk and not least risk management is an 
important part of how we understand society, organisations and businesses, and that a significant 
amount of organisational resources is devoted to measuring, analysing and mitigating risks (Parker, 
2005:468ff; Renn, 2008:173ff). Risk was first defined in statistical terms focusing on probability of an 
adverse outcome and creating indicators for how an event could be quantified and thereby managed 
(Lupton, 1999; Arnoldi, 2009; Aven, 2013). The attention was and continues to be on the potential for 
loss of value tangible or intangible and how organisations could improve their structures and systems, 
in order to avoid that losses being realised.  
 With	  Modernity	  emerged	  an	  understanding	  of	  how	  the	  world	  works	  as	  one	  of	  a	  linear	  progression	  of	  events	  that	  could	  be	  turned	  into	  objects	  of	  measurement	  (Beck, 1992:26; Beck, 
2007:213). By that suggesting that it is possible to comprehend risk much in the same way as one 
explains wealth distribution under the forces of production and consumption. This casual presumption 
about the world and how risk in it can be identified and analysed holds several contradictions and 
inherent problems of scale. Firstly, it is inductive in nature making assumption about the physical 
world based on very limited information in order to create the basis for decision-making (Arnoldi, 
2009:20f). Subscribing to the rational claim that in order to investigate risk it should be measurable 
and some form of probability assigned to it. Secondly, that these demarcations of possible influencing 
factors only become more significant in terms of uncertainty as complexity rises, creating problems 
with validity. While the modernist or inductive perspective makes it possible to talk about future 
events as probability of occurrence it does this on a foundation, which seems more and more fragile as 
the complexity of the organisational environment continues to accelerate. This gives room for 
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alternative perspectives, which seek to remedy these characteristics and provide insights into the 
concept of risk that might turn out to be more durable.     
 
With the rise of the postmodern perspective the concept of risk no longer seen as an exclusive, 
objective or fixed entity with distinct social or technological features but instead regarded as a new 
way of imagining how society and decisions affect businesses and their surroundings (Giddens, 
1990:46; Beck, 1992). This perspective does not exclude that real hazards and dangers are produced, 
which organisations need to deal with but rejects that mitigation can happen through so-called 
technology systems alone. With it comes the notion that different groups envision risks and interpret 
what is happening in their surroundings on a subjective basis grounded in the creation of meaning. 
Individuals perceive the character of risk as being an uncertain yet uncontrollable feature, which must 
be managed post hoc even as attempts to prevent are implemented through planning and organizing 
(Gephart et al. 2009; Green, 2009). The field of organisational risk is therefore regarded as having 
objective but also subjective and inter-subjective features, which are all based on the creation of 
meaning, and not as passively available outside of human activities as prescribed by modernity. 
 
This opening of the risk paradigm unlocks a wide variety of possibilities on how individuals and 
organisations identify risk and how it should be understood when we believe it is there. While the 
modernist approach is accepted and in common use, especially within the practice field, it has become 
clear that there are key areas of risk, which are unsolvable by the use of quantitative measurements 
and modelling alone (Power, 1997; Arnoldi, 2009). Grounding the science of risk on cognition and the 
presumption that actor’s act based on their ability to calculate a certain outcome, free of emotions and 
prone to maximising of own pleasure simply has its limits (Lupton, 1999:24). In practice it is often 
found that people and organisations are simply taking risks because they believe that it is the ‘right 
thing’ to do and not necessarily because that have calculated a likely outcome. The postmodern 
perspective attempts to bridge the gap between objective and subjectively perceived risk and how 
individuals act in a society made up of different risk alternatives. Fostering an understanding of 
organisational risk management as processes where organisations improve their ability to make sense 
of the risks and opportunities in their operating environment and subsequently take decisions. 
 
Risk and Society 
Ulrich Beck presented the idea that our perception of risk might have changed as the world gets more 
globalised (Beck, 1992; 2005; 2007). He argued that first and foremost environmental challenges 
constitute a new form of societal risk where individuals no longer are in control or necessary have a 
say in the dangers that they are exposed to. It is no longer possible just to move physically from one 
location to the next and be safe from manmade dangers, they are everywhere and we essentially 
produce them. The change in risk perception constitute a break in risk management, as technology is 
now a driver for increased societal risk and uncertainty rather than the controlling and mitigating 
factor that we have come to believe (Bammer, 2008; Green, 2009; Burns and Slovic, 2012). 
Emphasising that the nature of risk has become more global, less identifiable and unmanageable which 
in turn has formed the basis of greater anxieties, increasing social pressure on organisations (Beck, 
1992, Gephart et al., 2009). Leaving individuals as risk managers of their own lives where “our life” 
becomes in principle a risky venture. “A normal life story becomes a (seemingly) elective life, a risk 
biography, in the sense that everything (or nearly everything) is a matter for decision.” (Beck & Beck-
Gernsheim, 2002:48). That public are left with an ‘irrational’ or ‘deviant’ perception of risks opposed 
to what some perceive as logical and rational analysis (Beck, 1992:57f). This development has been 
nurtured by the declining credibility of political parties, risk experts, academic disciplines in general, 
parents, teachers and so on, giving rise to a society where we are constantly bombarded with 
information and with appeals to take sides. But also a place where everyone must learn how to switch 
off and mentally distance himself or herself from uncertainty relying on trust or ‘faith’ and 
management systems in order to take decisions (Giddens, 1990:27). Hereby a situation arises of what 
Beck and Beck Gernsheim (2002:46) characterise as “All commitment is self-commitment — and is 
therefore unpredictable”. The change in the role of first the state as a provider of security and 
subsequent the civil-society as facilitator and finally the individualisation of risk have meant that we 
rely much more on our own ability to navigate uncertainty than on the advice of experts. We no longer 
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evaluate but rather perceive risk, being our own risk manager drawing on Ewald’s (1991:199) claims 
that “Nothing is a risk in itself; it all depends on how one analyses the danger, consider the event”.  
 
The “social” in social risk 
Social risks follow from the beliefs, values and attitudes of the population that are not reflected in 
current government policy or business practices (Dunn, 1983). And social risk originates from the 
challenge that the MNC has when it comes to predicting the likelihood of collective action and the 
direction of such action might take when people are faced with discrepancies between their own 
values and those embodied in the institutions impacting their lives (Miller, 1992). In this sense social 
risk is regarded as a precursor to political risks but arises before formalised political behaviour. The 
actualisation of a social risk can take many forms like social unrest, demonstrations and blockades all 
the way to vandalism and smaller terrorist attacks. Events like these can in turn lead to political 
instability and government intervention outside the control of the company. The reason why the social 
and political aspects are separated is that they represent two different but distinct stakeholder groups 
one being government and those of activist groups and local communities. According to stakeholder 
theory it is possible for groups of people who have an interest in corporate activities to bypass existing 
government policy channels and appeal directly to business for changes in their practices (Freeman et 
al., 1983, Freeman et al. 2010:236). The potential for these kinds of actions demanding changing in 
the way business acts in relation to local stakeholders is most likely to occur when locally adopted 
social values provide a basis for questioning the legitimacy of existing business practices. In such 
cases, the business sector may choose to respond proactively to the social pressures prior to 
government policy pressure and thereby mitigating social rather than political risks. 
 
Risk and International Business 
Within IB is systemic risk linked closely with globalisation and internationalisation nurtured by the 
rise in complexity that comes with the increase in individual organisational contact points (Haynes, 
2000:60; Goldin, 2014). This is to an extent where some of the shareholder benefits of diversification 
are minimized or have disappeared altogether making investments potentially riskier. In parallel with 
this development are institutional systems for managing risks over multiple entities increasing in 
numbers and complexity (Kwok and Reeb, 2000, Desai. 2009). Market and economic risks together 
with factors like exchange rates, politics, culture, operational or technical issues, asymmetric 
information and own management competencies combined create such complex systems that produce 
increasingly quantities of risk, which need to be managed (Reeb et al., 1998; Lodh and Nandy, 2008). 
At the same time the institutional structure of MNCs are changing as different lines of communication 
and organisational ties emerge between financial, legal and managerial structures (Reich, 1990; Desai, 
2009). This in turn creating organisations which reflect limited transparency and lines of 
accountability, to the outside world, nurturing the ground for social risks that can attract the negative 
attention of Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), Government officials or others who assert 
pressure on the MNC. 
 
There is no doubt that globalisation and internationalisation of foreign markets have brought 
significant benefits in terms of business opportunities (Hymer, 1976; Dunning, 1981, Zaheer, 1995; 
Dunning, 1998; Feinberg and Gupta, 2009). But it has also presented new and complex challenges that 
MNCs have been struggling to overcome both internally and externally. One of the first to describe the 
risks associated with doing business abroad was Hymer (1976). His argument was that domestic firms 
have better access to relevant market information, are more deeply embedded in the national 
environment, and do not face foreign exchange risk. Under the term ‘Liability of Foreignness’ (LoF) 
there have been a multitude of studies, which have explored the risks of doing business internationally 
(Zaheer, 1995; Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997; Nachum, 2003; Bernard, 2010). The claim being that 
local firms have distinct benefits over the MNC when it comes to identifying social risks. They know 
the local culture and social norms much better than any entering MNC and thereby in a better position 
to identify possible issues that could influence the local community sense making process. This has 
spurred MNCs to create management systems like stakeholder engagement programs (Rache and 
Esser, 2006). The goal being that the systems can equalize the local businesses advantage and thereby 
minimize LoF. The literature on risk management has stayed away from the term social risk instead 
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focusing on political, national and cultural as distinct risks that could guide this process and on which 
institutions for mitigation could be build (Lodh and Nandy, 2008; Feinberg and Gupta. 2009). Within 
this field is risk defined in terms of quantifiable measurements and the chance that an event might 
influence organisations value creation processes giving rise to the use of standards and systems. 
However, studies show that the benefits of internationalisation is lower (at least in the short run) when 
perusing localised strategies in unknown regions, which could be an indication that the 
institutionalised tools applied by MNCs are not as effective as previous assumed (Kronborg and 
Thomsen, 2009; Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011; Asmussen and Goerzen, 2013). Companies have created 
institutions with the purpose of increasing the ability of organisations to sense and influence what is 
happening in their business environment (North, 1990; Ghishal & Westney, 2005; Hodgson, 2006). 
These institutions are designed to regulate the behaviour of decision makers in an effort to pursue 
certain organisational goals based on the information they retrieve. In this way it should be possible, at 
least in theory, to utilize the knowledge that the organisation has gained through handling similar 
events in the past and subsequently evade reoccurrences in other parts of the organisation. This 
institutionalised knowledge on risk is accumulated through the implementation of management 
systems, which enables the MNC to handle uncertain issues in their operating environment, like the 
ones originating from local stakeholders (Stoffle and Minnis, 2010; Merkelsen, 2011; Hah and 
Freeman, 2013; Bruce, 2014). While there is significant benefits in having a uniform organisational 
approach to construct risk resilience there are also drawbacks in the form of rigidity to events that are 
uncommon or new, which could indicate why they seemingly continue to fall short of mitigation. 
 
Further expanding on the institutional perspective and the utilization of rigid organisational systems 
can be witnessed when MNCs mimic what is regarded as successful strategy in an effort to lower the 
risks that they are exposed to (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Zaheer, 1995; Power, 2004a). This means 
that a MNC attempts to reduce risks by giving more or complete autonomy to a foreign subunit by 
allowing it to behave more like a local firm. And provided that local firms have reduced social risks, it 
would at least in theory, be the same as the subunit and constitute a viable LoF reduction strategy. 
This approach is consistent with an institutional perspective as the MNC looks for and accommodates 
to patterns, which are socially acceptable by its environment and thereby gain legitimacy (Westney, 
1989; Ghishal and Westney, 2005:47). Adopting an isomorph approach as this mimicking strategy is 
also called can provide a common language between company and local stakeholders that the 
organisation gets in contact with in turn helping to mitigate social risks. One way MNCs has pursued 
this type of strategy has been to incorporate normative standards and systematic approaches to serve as 
instructional knowledge platforms for social risk mitigation. I will return to the role and impact of 
these systems later. 
 
As described earlier there are two main conceptual understandings of risk; one founded in modernity 
and one prescribing to a post-modern approach. Modernity regards culture as the collective 
programming of the mind that distinguishes members of one group or organisation from others 
(Gesteland, 2005; Hofstede et al., 2010). Here risks arise from the misinterpretation of this 
programming by managers and subsequent decisions that harm or hinder the value creation processes 
of the company. While the post-modern perspective regards culture as complex and organic constantly 
changing its structure through a processes of meaning creation (Giddens, 1990; Douglas, 1992). 
Understanding national culture is an important aspect of IB as it can increase performance by learning 
about domestic markets and thereby reduce some of the risks associated with LoF (Halkos and 
Tzeremes, 2008). The focus has been on building organisational capabilities in line with a resource 
based view of the firm in an effort to explain and learn why some companies perform better than 
others (Penrose, 1959; Teece et al., 1997). However, for the MNC who needs to manage several 
cultures and environmental complexities it can exhaust the managerial capabilities to span several 
global contexts and multiple stakeholders (Siddharthan and Lall, 1982; Kogut and Singh, 1988; 
Hutzschenreuter et al., 2011). Risk is then witnessed when the organisation fail to correctly analyse 
the specific social context they are part of and subsequently take the necessary steps in-order to align 
organisational capabilities and the local business environment. Mitigation becomes effective when 
managers know how stakeholders make sense of the world around them and what tools to apply, in 
order to satisfy local stakeholder grievances while maintaining corporate goals.  
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The Risk of everything 
The complexity of risk as systems of representation presented to organisation and individuals carries 
with it several implications (Power, 1997; Power, 2004). Firstly, that the management of risk can be 
described as instruments for framing objects with the purpose of action and intervention by decision 
makers provides a new and much more social perspective. Secondly, that this form of risk 
‘management’ thinking has carried with it that we no longer exclusively regard risks as something 
which organisations and individuals are exposed to from its external environment. As organisations 
are co-producing risk within themselves and with the different stakeholders they are in contact with, 
risk production is as much an internal as an external event. One of the major drivers in this 
development is coming from risk professionals themselves who are increasingly focused on their own 
risks with a view to avoiding responsibility, blame and financial penalty (Power, 2004). In this way, 
mitigation becomes the task of dispersing responsibility and actions to individuals whom might have 
other perceptions of a risk event and the actions needed to mitigate. This highlights the underlying 
idea that organisations are increasingly tasked with the challenge of dealing with the risk management 
of everything. Primary risks are conceptualised within our traditional understanding of risk, 
originating from the external environment and being objective and measurable in nature. And the 
secondary risks, produced by the risk managers themselves, as members of the organisations they are 
part of and the systems that they implement. This has spurred risk as a practice field to move in two 
distinct directions: one where organisations develop more and more complex internal controls creating 
ever more comprehensive systems of management (Nadesan, 2011). And another, which Power 
(2004a:64) calls “"intelligent" risk management that is not control obsessed and which has a second 
order capacity to observe and challenge the effects of the internal control system itself”. Where he 
draws on Luhmanns (1993) notion that risk management in essence is a human activity of decision 
making about the future which has the purpose of transforming danger (or uncertainty) into a the 
domain of responsibility. 
 
From this constructionist perspective where risk essentially is a social event made up of different 
stakeholders contribution to the formulation of shared meaning on what constitutes a risk. This does 
not mean that there is consensus on how to handle or what part of the event should be prioritised but 
rather that there is agreement that a certain event constitutes some kind of risk. By subscribing to this 
perspective it is possible to elaborate on how organisations navigate in a business environment that is 
increasingly becoming more and more global, opaque and presents a multitude of risk generating 
stakeholders. This includes communities that frame and make sense of MNC actions in the light of 
what is believed to constitute risk to them under the influence or control by the company. Social risk is 
then defined in terms of how local stakeholders construct reality through a sensemaking and framing 
process which constitute at risk by its combined capability to influence organisational value creating 
activities. And the management of social risk is the subsequent organisational appreciation of these 
realities in order to create the basis of qualified decision-making and thereby successful risk 
mitigation. However, it remains unclear how this reality is constructed and subsequently how the 
MNC is to approach and manage social risk. 
 
Social risk and the sociological approach to risk management 
Risk management research is and continues to be dominated by inductive economic logic, which 
makes it unable to produce the predictions on which the paradigm promises (Bammer & Smithson, 
2008:147; Zachmann, 2014). Within the field there is a well-established literature on different 
categories of risk management such as economic, technical, operational or legal that makes the 
promise that these types of risks can be identified and mitigated (Daniel, 2000; Olsson, 2002; 
Bremmer, 2005; Crouhy et al., 2006). The development towards a distinct form of social risk analyses 
based on co-construction of risk between stakeholders and organisations can be traced back to two 
developments within the sociological approach to risk. First of all, even though it is possible to 
objectively asses a wide range of factors related to one specific risk-event, it has proven to be very 
hard to convince individuals and communities who are subjected to the risk that it is within what 
experts deem ‘acceptable limits’ (Slovic, 1993; Giddens, 1999; Conchie and Burns, 2008). This 
illustrates the constraints of objective risk analysis and communication, as stakeholders need to relate 
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the objective risk to their subjective creation of meaning. And even with this insight, into the 
distinction between perceived and objective risk, it has been an area which has been impossible to 
bridge using dominant forms of risk management research, despite several attempts (Holzmann et al., 
2003, Kytle and Ruggie, 2005).  
 
Another development that has contributed to our understanding of risk, relates to the concept of Black 
swans (Unknown Unknowns) or Known Unknown (What you think you know but really do not) 
(Kerwin, 1993; Taleb, 2007; Mikes, 2011; Aven, 2013). This approach is based in three assumptions 
about human behaviour and about the world we live in. Firstly, that we maintain an illusion of 
understanding, or how everyone think he knows what is going on in a world that is more complicated 
(or random) than is realized. Secondly there is the retrospective distortion, or how we assess matters 
only after the fact, as we are only making sense of the world around us when events have occurred and 
not before they are actually happening and third that we tend to overvaluation factual information 
based on numbers as more reliable than other forms of information (Taleb, 2007:50). Black swans or 
known unknowns are events that are deemed highly improperly by any objective measure and are seen 
as extreme events relative to the present knowledge/beliefs (Taleb, 2007; Brown, 2013; Aven, 2013). 
An organisational strategy for handling type of events is seen through the utilization and playing out 
risk scenarios. During a session, experts and managers are tested on their risk management skills using 
role-play and imaginative ways to create stress during the course of an event in order to follow the 
decision making process and learn from new ways of solving difficult issues along the way (Vecchiato 
& Roveda, 2009; Zalik, 2010). Scenario planning is a tool that organisations can use in order to 
translate their organisational capabilities into appropriate operational responses by learning and re-
enactment of exogenous events (Worthington et al, 2009; Buytendijk et al., 2010). Social risks, as 
presented by community stakeholders can in this context be regarded as factors which needs to be 
evaluated and mitigated on the same terms as all the other variables included in the scenario. The aim 
is that specialists and managers learn from their experiences and thereby improve their decisions 
making capabilities when confronted with a similar situation.  
 
Social risk and Communication 
The definition of risk communication offered by the National Research Council (1989) is one of the 
most used and talks of “Risk communication as an interactive process of exchange of information and 
opinion among individuals, groups, and institutions. It involves multiple messages about the nature of 
risk and other messages, not strictly about risk, that express concerns, opinions, or reactions to risk 
messages or to legal and institutional arrangements for risk management.” (p. 21). Other risk 
communication definitions have elaborated on this emphasizing the importance of a more problem 
centred approach like the need for dialogue between communicators and stakeholders (Mitchel, 1997; 
Palenchar, 2005), and the necessity of ongoing risk monitoring (Coombs, 2012). 
 
In the wake of several international scandals, which almost brought some of the biggest international 
companies to their knees we witnessed a rise in communication research that centred on the 
organisation in crisis (Grolin, 1998; Baron, 2008; Ma, 2010). Initially organisational crisis 
communication focused on formulating normative how-to strategies that the organisations could use to 
minimize the risks that they are confronted with and maintain or restore their image (Benoit, 1997; 
Benoit and Cerwinski, 1997, Morgan, et al, 2002; Coombs, 2012). These strategies ranged from 
preparing and planning communicative responses to a potential crisis, to different strategies that could 
be utilized when the crisis finally materialised, much in-line with the scenario approach described 
earlier. Within crisis communication there is a focus on formulating the most optimal response 
strategy in order to minimize the adverse organisational impact and maintain the image of the 
organization as events unfolds (Benoit 1997; Coombs and Holladay, 2002; Coombs, 2007). There are 
four main theoretical themes active within the field of risk communication. Each one takes a distinct 
perspective on individual and organisational behaviour. First, Coombs and Benoit looked at how 
organisations could cope with a crisis that has the potential to risk threatening the value creation 
process. Second perspective is presented by Mary Douglas (1985; 1992) who argues for a cultural or 
symbolic view focused on how risks can be regarded as boundaries between the individual or self and 
its environment. Thirdly, the creation of frames of understanding, from which we make sense of the 
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world around us is presented by Goffman (1986) and Karl Weick (2001) and finally the stakeholder 
approach put forward by Freeman (1984) and Mitchel, Agle and Wood (1997) who looks at 
stakeholder identification and salience that could influence decision making. 
 
The first theoretical theme that deals with risk communication focuses on the event itself and the 
organisational response to a risk being realised. Both Image Restoration Theory (Benoit, 1995) and 
Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) (Coombs, 2007) were developed in order to equip 
managers with a set of tools to confront stakeholder grievances. Image restoration theory focuses on 
strategies for organisational image repair after a risk event, pointing out two important components in 
an attack. First, that the accused is believed to be responsible for an event or action, and second that 
the event or action is considered to be offensive. While SCCT suggests that people judge situations by 
making attributions to three dimensions: locus (the cause is located internal vs. external), stability (if 
the cause changes during a period of time), and controllability (the level of control of the cause). Both 
Image restoration theory and SCCT have a significant focus on the attribution of blame and the 
identification of important/salient stakeholders prescribing different strategies that organisation can 
implement. Here Benoit describes five categories of image restoration strategies - Denial, Evasion of 
Responsibility, Reducing the offensiveness of the event, Corrective action, and Mortification (Benoit, 
1997). These are in turn organized into 14 rhetorical strategies that organisations can pursue; Denial is 
either refusing responsibility for an event or deflecting the blame for its realisation away from the 
organisation to other individuals or agencies; Evasion of responsibility refers to claims that the crisis 
was an accident, the lack of sufficient information, that the intentions were actually good, or that the 
organisation was provoked. Reducing the perceived offensiveness entails mitigating the negative 
effects of the crisis by strengthening the positive side of the organization and suggesting a different 
frame of understanding for the crisis, attacking the accuser, and compensating the victims; Corrective 
action involves efforts which will help restore the situation by making changes to prevent the 
recurrence of the undesirable event and Mortification where the organisation accepts responsibility 
and asks to be forgiven by the public. All of these strategies are aimed at reducing the adverse effect 
of an event that are presented by stakeholders and whom the organisation perceive as a threat to the 
value (tangible or intangible) it has accumulated.  The central issue, which SCCT tries to solve, is the 
protection of organizational reputation through the correct assessment of the crisis situation and 
selecting an appropriate crisis response strategy. Coombs (2007) suggests that there are four 
dimensions in crisis situation, which can affect the attributions that the public makes about the crisis 
namely the Crisis type, Severity, Crisis history, and Prior reputation. The SCCT divides crisis types 
into three clusters (Coombs 2007; Coombs and Holladay 2002). First, the victim cluster is defined as 
crises with very weak attributions of organizational responsibility, and the organisation can be viewed 
as a victim of the event. Second, the accidental cluster involves crises in which a certain, but low, 
level of responsibility are attributed to the organisation, and if the event could be considered to be 
unintentional or uncontrollable by the organisation. Third, the preventable cluster includes crises for 
which organizations intentionally place stakeholders at risk, knowingly violating laws or regulations, 
or not doing enough to prevent an accident, and the organization is perceived as being responsible. 
Severity may include deaths, injuries, property destruction, and environmental harm. Crisis history 
refers to whether or not an organization has had a similar crisis in the past. A high consistency of crisis 
history suggests an organisation has an on-going problem that needs to be addressed or have a lot of 
experience dealing with being a victim. Prior reputation examines the credibility of the organisation. 
As with image restoration theory (Benoit, 1997) the aim is to create situations where stakeholder 
grievances are identified and mitigated. However, with SCCT it is also taken into account that the 
organisation historical performance could provide resilience against attacks on its image and ability to 
operate efficiently. 
 
Both of Image restoration theory and SCCT entails that decision makers have information that enables 
them to pick the correct communication strategy, which will alleviate a given crisis situation. Because 
of their reactive nature, they do little for managers in terms of understanding risks, but focuses almost 
exclusively on the effect of realised risk being communicative in nature. However, using a social risk 
perspective, it is possible to take advantage of these communicative tools for stakeholder grievance 
identification and mitigation. As social risk and the management of it rely on the ability of 
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organisations to identify salient stakeholders, who could influence its decision-making processes, 
crisis communication becomes a resource for possible risk identification. Turning the Image 
restoration and SCCT around and asking what stakeholders could possible provoke a communicative 
crisis response and by that empowering organisations to inductively identifying social risks.      
 
The second theoretical theme is presented Mary Douglas (1985) and the notion that risk should be 
understood as it perceived by the layperson or ‘the public’. She criticised the mainstream (eg. the 
modern) discourse of risk theory, which she saw as a perverse form of forensics and development 
within a clean scientific subject (Douglas, 1992:11). Claiming that “risk is not only the probability of 
an event but also the probable magnitude of its outcome, and everything depends on the value that is 
set on the outcome. The evaluation of a possible risk event is a political, aesthetic, and moral matter, 
which in practical life means that private decisions about risk are taken by comparing many risks 
alternatives, and their probable good and bad outcomes. No risk item will normally be considered in 
isolation and nor does intellectual activity happen in isolation” (Douglas, 1992:31). When regarding 
risk events, that are not only objective and measurable entities, this constitutes a major turn towards 
identifying and conceptualisation social risk. It is now regarded as it looks to the community and the 
reality that they perceive rather than purely subjective or objective in nature and that this is the focus 
of effective social risk management. 
 
The third theme focuses on the process in which these community realities are created and how they 
can be understood through two communicative perspectives namely framing and sensemaking. 
Goffman (1975; 1986) promoted the concept of framing as organisational premise that constitute a 
schema for interpretation of a given event and sensemaking that was conventionalised by Karl Weick 
(Weick et al., 2005) created a framework for how these frames of meaning was constructed. In order 
to understand the world around us we make use of frames or ‘reference maps’ from which we can 
understand the context we are placed in. Their purpose is two-fold. First, they help us organise 
experience and enables people to recognize what is happening and provide barriers (eg. Frame) so that 
we are able to distinguish between uncertainty (Unknown) and risk (Known). Second, they offer a 
historic set of past decisions that we can draw upon when making new decisions or an appropriate 
behavioural response to new information. One should not see frames as fixed institutions but rather as 
a socially constructed map of how to best function in society and people makes sense of the world 
around them based on these maps. However, they also set limits to our perception of reality, as they 
constitute a level of analysis where individuals try to understand what is real and what is not. That the 
frames enable us to know important things about reality but also that our sense of its realness stands in 
contrast to our feeling that some things lack this quality (Goffman, 1975). We can then ask under what 
conditions these feelings are generated and the factors included in this process or how we sense-make. 
Frames are constructed, moulded and eventually destroyed through a sensemaking process (Weick et 
al. 2005). We simply cannot make sense of the world without mentally organising it and there is a 
distinct pattern to how the process unfolds and the way we construct patterns of significant meaning 
(Morgan et al., 1983). According to Weick there are seven themes to this pattern, which enables us to 
evaluate the process of meaning construction (Weick, 2001:11). First, reality is an on-going 
accomplishment that continually changes the way we think about the past and make assumptions 
about the future. Second, people attempt to create order and continuously create comparisons, 
expectations and actions based on perceived patterns of meaning in our surroundings. Third, 
sensemaking is retrospective process as we are remembering and considering past events. And fourth, 
through this process people attempt to make situations rational accountable by applying socially 
acceptable reasons as justification for their actions. Fifth, we make presumptions about patterns in 
social life as they contain a certain interpretation making symbolic processes are central. Sixth, people 
create images of a wider reality through the creation of mental maps that can guide decision-making 
and action and finally that these images rationalize what people are doing. By creating the groundwork 
for a sensemaking process individuals introduce stability into an ambiguous flow of events through 
justification by decreasing complexity and increase social order.  
 
As frames and sensemaking are individual undertakings it also entails an individual responses in-line 
with the thinking that risk is subjectively perceived rather than an objectively identifiable event. When 
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applying this to social risk the organisational challenge can be massive when a multitude of 
stakeholders, who with their own frames of understanding and sensemaking processes, are evaluating 
their surroundings and possible identify the organisations actions as counterproductive to their own 
aims. It then becomes the task of organisations through their own sensemaking and framing process, to 
identify and understand the possible impact that these stakeholders can inflict on the value creating 
process and the subsequent possible need to mitigate risk. This also means that organisations will have 
many more stakeholders claiming that they are exposed to risk, than will actually be the case, in terms 
of what can affect the creation of value by a given organisation. 
 
Identifying how different stakeholders create meaning does little in terms of knowing which ones the 
organisation should engage with first. Therefor organisations need to be able to identify community 
stakeholders who represent the biggest impact on its decision-making processes (Freeman, 1984; 
Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Mitchel, 1997; Ulmer, 2001). Stakeholders are in this context 
individuals or groups of people, who through a sensemaking and framing process, can affect or who 
are affected by the activities of the company. Mitchel, Agle and Wood (1997) presented a model for 
how organisations might not only identify stakeholders but also be able to understand the possible risk 
salience that they represented. They used three categories of typification - Power, Legitimacy and 
Urgency. Where powerful stakeholders poses the ability to coerce and impose their will in a 
relationship, legitimate stakeholders gain salience through a desirable common good that all can agree 
upon and that urgency can be roughly defined as some event which calls for the urgent or pressing 
attention of the organisation. It is in this context possible to think that the most powerful stakeholder 
would automatically also represent the most salient as they can make an actor do something that they 
normally would not have done and in theory make their claim both urgent and legitimate. However, 
this might not necessarily be true as power has no authority without being legitimate and the 
recognition that stakeholders can have a legitimate claim in relation to specific events (Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995; Mitchel et al. 1997). For organisations that need to take decisions it is equally 
important to understand how urgent stakeholder claims as it is to know how powerful or legitimate 
their claim is before attributing salience. As with both power and legitimacy, is urgency a socially 
constructed phenomenon and might be perceived differently by stakeholders, managers and others in 
the organisations environment. An urgent event can simply be characterised as the degree to which 
stakeholder claims call for the immediate attention of the organisation and that the organisation 
respond to this claim.  
 
Decision makers who are faced with social risk are continuously being confronted with a multitude of 
different stakeholder claims. Knowing that these are rarely objectively verifiable, managers need to 
ascribe a level of salience or priority to each one, depending on their own sensemaking and framing 
process. At the same time being aware that stakeholders themselves have gone through a similar 
process of deductive reasoning. As we explore social risk through the eyes of communication theory it 
becomes evident that the ability of organisations to navigate and take quality decisions by reducing 
risk and/or optimising opportunity depends on the individual decision maker competences to 
understand and analyse the world around him or her. And that organisational resilience depends not on 
the fine masked systems which they are able to implement but on the individual abilities to sense how 
different individual or groups perceive the world around them and based on that take decisions. 
 
Social risk and Corporate Social Responsibility systems 
The institutionalisation of social risk management has happened through the standardisation of CSR 
into management systems that can form the basis for corporate decision making (De Bakker et al, 
2005). These systems represents a crossover from cultural and communication studies into the field of 
corporate risk management linking standards or checklists with the idea of corporations as global 
citizens (Bebbington et al., 2007; ISO, 2010; Palenchar et al, 2011; IFC, 2012). The use of CSR 
standards means, at least in theory, that organisations learn and document how they systematically 
engage with their stakeholders (Nadesan, 2011). The standards are designed to enable organisations to 
comply and report on their ability to conform to certain universally recognised norms and thereby 
meet salient stakeholder expectations stakeholders (Bebbington et al, 2007: Palenchar et al, 2011:189). 
The main arguments for adopting a CSR approach to risk management are the following. First, the use 
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of CSR standards provides the organisation with a stamp of approval through accreditation from a 
recognised institution. Second, it enables the organisation to be in accordance with investor 
expectations in terms of a diverse risk management through the use of a recognised approach and 
thereby communicating that environmental and social risks are identified and mitigated systematically. 
And finally it helps create an image of the organisation as a social responsible member of the 
community and thereby lower the social risks that it might be exposed to. All of which are believed to 
reduce risks and build resilience (through a favourable crisis history and isomorphic mimicking 
strategies) against stakeholder grievances that the organisation could be exposed to. There are two 
distinct types of standards in use. The first type of standard primarily focuses on organisational 
compliance to objective measurements, such as legislation or safety standards which can also be 
characterised as the risk of non-compliance (Perrini, 2006). These types of standards is a continuation 
of the ones described within what Beck (1992) calls the modern understanding of risk and originates 
from the effort to objectively assess possible social risks the organisation is being exposed to. The 
second set of standards can be characterised as, what Michael Power (2004a) called “intelligent” 
systems, which has the aim of building organisational capacity and learning processes in line with a 
sociological and communicative perspective on risk management. Systems that can fits Michael 
Powers description are promoted by both norm formulating and private organisations in the hope that 
they will influence stakeholders through engagement in their sensemaking (Carroll, 2004; 2004; 
UNEP Finance Initiatives, 2005; UN PRI, 2006; UN Global Compact, 2008; Barkemeyer, 2009; ISO 
26000, 2010; IFC, 2012). In this way adopting a strategy of CSR standardisation and stakeholder 
engagement can be seen as assurance or at least give some forewarning of upcoming risk events that 
companies can use to manage their exposure from stakeholders. The major driver for adopting these 
types of systems are the potential exposure from local and global communities forcing companies to 
conform to prevailing social and/or environmental norms (BSR, 2003; Morsing & Schultz, 2006; 
Vogel, 2008). In-line with the notion that standards constitute a library of past frames or the framing 
experiences of others that the organisation have deemed relevant. An increasing number of companies 
are taking on CSR standards as a way to identify and assess social risks in their operating environment 
drawing on all of the above perspectives.  
 
Towards the conceptual framework of Social risk  
MNCs and IB has been struggling with how to get to grips with increased and complex risks in a 
globalised world. By being subjected to Liability of Foreignness cross-border companies have a 
distinct disadvantage to local companies in the operating environment. The response from MNCs to 
overcome these has been to create ever more comprehensive and complex management systems 
including systems related to risk in order to deal with these challenges. However, when confronted 
with social risks these tools are ineffective and do little in terms of mitigation of the dangers that 
influence the value creation process of the company. Social risk being defined in terms of how local 
stakeholders construct reality through a sensemaking and framing process which constitute at risk by 
its combined capability to influence organisational value creating activities and thereby influence 
organisational decision-making processes. The management of social risk is then the processes and 
systems which the organisation can set in motion in order to influence stakeholder sensemaking and 
framing processes. 
 
My argument is that by using a cross-disciplinary approach taking its outset in a sociological 
conceptualization of risk and applying tools from communication studies an alternative approach to 
identification and mitigation of social risk can be utilized. It is proposed that MNCs can improve their 
social risk management abilities by organizing their efforts using “intelligent” CSR systems, which are 
based on capabilities to identify frames and sensemaking processes in the local communities where 
they are active. This does not exclude so-called objective measurements but supplements these tools 
by focusing on community sensemaking processes and creating an appropriate response utilizing 
communicative tools from scenario building and crisis management. 
 
Sensemaking processes and frames of meaning can be identified when individuals act alone or form 
groups in order to influence the value creation process of the MNC. If stakeholders are able to 
congregate enough salience through a combination of the legitimacy of the claim, power to influence 
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the value creation process and its urgency, it will be possible to influence decision makers. This 
influence can be either positive (in the sense that it can offer an opportunity) or perceived as negative 
in the form of risk. However, it is also possible for the MNC to create the conditions for the reverse 
process where organisations influence the sensemaking process of stakeholders through reporting and 
use of standards. The efficiency would then be dependent on the “intelligence” of the system to make 
sense of the individual framing process and come up with an appropriate response. And because of the 
retrospective nature of the sensemaking the reporting and other communication of the MNC would 
become a natural part of this process provided that it has the capabilities to communicate effectively 
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